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Introduction
By wide agreement, many less developed countries have "over-valued"
currencies.

Yet most countries are reluctant to devalue their currencies

even when the signs of over-valuation are unmistakable.
are raised to devaluation,

A variety of objections

but most of them reduce to three basic ones:

1) devaluation will not in fact improve the devaluing country's payments

position;

2) devaluation might work if given a chance, but it will unleash

forces in the economy that will eventually undercut its benefits and those
of other economic policies; and

3) even if devaluation works it will be

politically disastrous to those officials who are responsible for undertaking
it.
Despite these sources of resistance, currency devaluation has frequently
taken place under the pressure of circumstances. These devaluations provide
an opportunity to evaluate, at least crudely, the consequences of devaluation
and to assess the extent to which the foregoing fears are justified.
study generalizes from the experience of 24 devaluations, involving
-¢,This
I
It includes most of the currency devaluations during

19 different countries.
the period 1959-1966.

Those devaluations during this period that are ex

cluded involve countries in unusual circumstances, such as Laos and Vietnam,
Venezuela was also excluded because it is a country with a large trade surplus,
and therefore untypical of less developed countries. Canada, on the other
hand, was included in the study because of its large trade deficit and regular
importation of capital, making it similar in that respect to many less de
veloped countries.
both had

Iceland and Spain, like many less developed countries,

multiple currency practices. A few cases of devaluation in the mid

fifties were also included, to enlarge the sample.
influenced the selection.

Availability of data also
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The intent of the study was to examine discrete changes in exchange
rates -- a" once-for-all" change in exchange rate from one level to another,
such as is called for under the present international rules governing inter
national payments.

This consideration ruled out those cases, such as Chile

and Uruguay, where the effective exchange rate has depreciated almost con
tinuously over long periods of time.

It might also seem to rule out Ar.gentina

and Brazil, where hardly a year has gone by without some change in the effec
tive exchange rate.

But these two countries did each have one devaluation that

was so far-reaching in character and extensive in amount that they seemed to
warrant inclusion here.

Canada and Peru had floating exchange rates; but in

each case the rate depreciated from one relatively well-defined level to another
in the course of a year, so it was thought worthwhile to include them.
The study is subject to three important limitations. First, economic
data for less developed countries, while steadily improving, are still very
incomplete for .many countries and are often of poor quality. Second, the data
are inevitably after the fact, and they reflect many economic changes other
than the devaluation under examination.

Much analytical work is required to con

vert the actual observations into "other things being equal" observations.
Only a few crude adjustments to take account of other factors are made here,
partly because of inadequacies in the data that would be required to undertake sophisticated adjustments, partly because of the conceptual difficulties involved in such adjustments.
were not studied in any depth.

Finally, the 24 cases of devaluation

Those well versed in the construction of the

statistics from these countries may cringe at the use to which they are put
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here; time was not available to explore their construction in the detail re-.
quired for sophisticated judgments concerning how they can and how they cannot
be used legitimately. This study is therefore merely a start on a more thorough
cross-sectional investigation of currency devaluations. It is a preliminary
report and a tentative agenda for further work, and it is hoped that the generali
zations made here will stimulate such work, of which surprisingly little has
been undertaken to date (see the bibliography attached).
What follows will be divided into six sections, the first is concerned
with the nature of devaluation.

It is followed by sections on the effects of

devaluation on the balance of payments, on the terms of trade, on the level

of economic activity, on prices and wages, and on the political fate of the
governments immediately responsible.

I.

Nominal vs. Effective Devaluation
Under the rules of the International Monetary Fund, to which all countries

considered here belong, each member country must declare a fixed "par value"
for its currency, in terms of gold or the U.S. dollar, which is to be applicable
to all current transactions with foreigners. A currency devaluation involves
a specified reduction in the gold or dollar value of the devaluing country's
currency.
Most currency devaluations are not this straightforward. For a variety
of reasons, many less developed countries do not apply a single, well-defined
exchange rate to all current account transactions with foreigners. Rather,
they have a system of multiple rates, the rates used for a particular trans
action depending on the type of transaction and even sometimes on the foreign

-4-

country involved in the transaction .

Moreover, a country with a technically uni

fied exchange rate may use import tariffs, export taxes or subsidies, and
direct controls to achieve much the same effects as with multiple rates.

Many

exchange rate adjustments therefore are piecemeal, with the government engaging in salami tactics to achieve an effect thought to be too dangerous to
be taken all at once.

1

The cases considered here do involve a major adjust-

ment, however, and therefore exclude some of the more devious exchange ad
justments that are nevertheles s cumulativel y significant .
Where the de facto exchange system has become highly complicated , usually
under the pressure of accumulatin g balance-of-p ayments difficultie s, devalu
ation is often used as an occasion for tidying the system up as well as for
changing the par value of the currency. Thus currency devaluation s take a
wide variety of forms, and they cannot be handled satisfactor ily in any
simple, catchall fashion.

However, it is possible to distinguish between two

broad types of policy change accompanying devaluation : exchange reform and import
liberalizat ion.
Exchange reform involves the elimination or virtual elimination of
multiple exchange rates and the movement to a unitary rate or something close
to it, whether fixed or flexible. The qualificatio n "virtual"

is

introduced to allow for those cases in which the country retains a separate,
less favorable rate for traditional exports of primary products, substitutin g
for an export tax with the purpose either of preventing a deterioratio n in
the country's terms of trade or, more often, of capturing the windfall pro
fits or rents accruing to producers of traditional products whose supply is
thought to be inelastic in the short run.

-5-

Import liberalization involves the reduction of quantitative restrictions
on the flow of imports:

enlargement or elimination of import quotas, relaxa

tion of licensing requirements, and often the reduction or elimination of ad
vance deposits and other impediments to imports.

Import liberalization shades

from a little to a lot. Both exchange reform and import liberalization can be
spread over many months or even years, and this practice has been especially
common for import liberalization.

In addition, whether or not exchange re

form or import liberalization occur, devaluation may be accompanied by a sta
bilization program, involving restrictive monetary and fiscal action designed
to reduce the rate of inflation and help bring external payments directly into
balance.
In ten of the 24 cases considered here devaluation was associated with
extensive exchange reform and in ten cases it was accompanied by moderate to
substantial liberalization of imports; both moves complicate the task of
assessing the effects of devaluation. Where a change in par value of a currency
was accompanied by a unification of multiple exchange rates or by changes in
import tariffs and export subsidies or taxes, the change in the effective
exchanges rates -- the amount of local currency that purchasers must actually
pay for a dollar's worth of imports and the amount of local currency that an
exporter actually receives for a dollar's worth of exports -- might be sub
stantially less than the nominal change in the exchange rate and may differ
between exports and imports.
Table 1 lists the devaluations examined in this study, the month of the
devaluation, the nominal devaluation, and the effective devaluation as it
affected merchandise exports and imports, calculated in a manner described in
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Appendix A. Where the formal change in par value took place well after a
major exchange reform, the "nominal" change in exchange rate and the indicated
date apply to the principal import rate rather than to the par value.

In

many instances the entries in the table (including some of the dates) should
be regarded as approximati ons rather than exact figures.

The effective de

valuations, in particular, often cover a period extending some months before
or after the month of the nominal devaluation .

Moreover, the figures in

Table 1 may overstate the effective devaluation for several reasons.

Where

one of the incentives to export is an entitlement to import "linked" to ex
port performance , devaluation of the rate applicable to imports, by reducing
the profits on importing, will also reduce the incentive to export.

Second,

tariffs on items important in the cost of living may be temporarily reduced
to limit politically sensitive price increases, and such reductions may not
be fully reflected in the figures here. Finally, the effective devaluation s
exclude the effects of removing import quotas.
Several features of the results in Table 1 stand out. First, effective
devaluation was usually less than the nominal devaluation , and often sub
stantially less. The reverse, however, is apparent in a few cases. Second,
more often than not effective devaluation for imports was larger than that
for exports. This fact arises from two causes.

a) Countries that are heavy

exporters of foodstuffs and raw materials often imposed an export tax or a
less favorable exchange rate on such products when the currency was devalued.
b) Countries have increasingl y resorted to subsidies for their non-traditi onal
exports when it becomes clear that the exchange rate is so over-valued as to
discourage such exports. The subsidies are removed on realignment of the

-7Table 1
Nominal and Effective Currency Devaluation

Nqm;li;u1.J

a
Devaluation -

Country

Effective Devaluation
Imports
Exports

Time of Devaluation (percent change in dollars per.unit of local currencx;)
1959
1964
1961-May 1962
1962
1965
1961
1961
1953
1960
1961
1966
1962

Argentina
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Greece
Iceland
Iceland
India
Israel

Jan.
Sep.
June
Nov.
Sep.
Sep.
July
Apr.
Feb.
Aug.
June
Feb.

Korea
Korea
Korea
Mexico
Morocco

Feb. 1960
Feb. 1961
May 1964
Apr. 1954
Oct. 1959
July 1955

Pakistan
Peru
Jan. 1958-Apr. 1959
Philippines Jan. 1962
Philippines Nov. 1965
July 1959
Spain
Sep. 1964
Tunisia
Aug. 1958
Turkey

a

66
66b
5
26
33
15
17

50
57
12
37
40
25
50
49
31
17

30
31
40
10
30
20
56

63
69'
5

61
61h
10c

13
6
14
10
31
54
12 d
n.a.
1ic

23
25
6
16
41
41
lld,
27c

29
35
44
28
17
28
31

34
36
50
31
12c

14

16
0
26d
17,,1

26c

28
31

10

24d
\20

v.

39d

Parity or principal im~ort rate

b During calendar year 1964
c includes known changes in import duties and export subsidies
d

Effective devaluation calculated for goods and services; the re
mainder for merchandise only
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exchange rate, often to be re-introduced at a later date.

Import tariffs,

on the other hand, are more often regarded as permanent rather than temporary
features of the landscape, and while some special import surcharges are re
moved at the time of devaluation, the basic tariff level typically remains.

II.

Devaluation and the Balance of Payments
Devaluation is normally undertaken to improve the balance of payments,

and a devaluation may therefore be judged successful to the extent that it
has led to an improvement in the balance of payments.
will normally be on trade flows:

The principal effects

by increasing the profitability of export

sales relative to local sales, devaluation should stimulate exports; and by
making imports more expensive relative to local goods and services, devaluation should discourage imports.

The balance on goods and services should im

prove. But a devaluation may have no observed effect on trade yet still be
judged highly successful if it permits numerous controls and subsidies, re
quired at the old exchange rate to prevent a far worse balance than that actually
observed to be eliminated.

Moreover, a successful devaluation might actually

worsen the balance on goods and services if, in addition to permitting elimina
tion of undesirable balance-of-payments controls, it induced a larger net

inflow of capital from abroad. Such an increased net inflow might result
from an inflow of private foreign investment to take advantage of the improved
competitive position of the country, or, lately, from increased inflows of
foreign aid for which devaluation and exchange reform were preconditions.

-9Table 2 records the balance of payments before and after devaluation.
The first column indicates the balance of goods a.nd services in the year
preceding dev.aluation. Since few less developed countries compile balance-of
payments data on a quarterly or even semi-annual basis, the ''preceding year"
is the calendar year preceding the year of devaluation when the devaluation
took place before May of that year; otherwise it is the year of devaluation,
except for Korea (1964) and India. Those two countries compile semi-annual
data, and the record here runs from July through June for those two cases. 2
The change recorded is between the preceding year and the year immediately
following it.

The monetary balance recorded for the two successive years in

the last two columns represents the change in net international reserves,
defined to include short-term official borrowing abroad and transactions with
the International Monetary Fund as well as changes in gross reserves. All
entries are measured in terms of dollars, the foreign currency, as is appro
priate in assessing a country's balance of payments position; but in a few
cases these had to be computed from data reported in local currency.
In fifteen cas0s the baJ.ance on goods and services improved in the
year following devaluation. The balance remains negative in most of these cases;
that is not surprising, nor does it indicate that devalue.tion failed to correct
the balance-of-payments position. These countries are all normal importers
of capital {although in the yee:- preceding devaluation four countries in
fact had current account surpluses, all for rather special reasons), and can
be expected to run deficits on goods and services. The point of devaluation
is to reduce this deficit to the point at which it can be readily financed
by capital imports, not to eliminate it.

-10Table 2
Balance of Payments
($ million)
Balance on
Goods and Services
Country

Time of Devaluation

Change in
Capital8
Inflow·

Monetary Balance
Preceding
Year

Following
Year

Previous
Year

Change

-256

270

63

-214

119

39

221
-283

78
293

458
127

Argentina

Jan, ,1959

Brazil
Canada

• 1964
1961-1962

-859.

159
117

Colombia

Nov., 1962

-176

30

-14

-44

-29

Colombia

Sept., 1965

-24

-253

157

57

-39

Costa Rica

Sept., 1961
July, 1961

-2
18

20

Eduador

-20
-28

8

-11
-14

7
12

Greece

Apr., 1953

-136

60

-23

19

56

Iceland

Feb., 1960

-13

2

12

-9

6

Iceland

Au~., 1961

5

3

s

12

20

India

June, 1966

-1313

-35

54

-29

-10

Israel

Feb., 1962

-450

-33

122

75

164

Korea

Feb., 1960

-228

-34

31

4

1

Korea

Feb., 1961

-262

64

-18

1

47

Korea

May, 1964

-320

112

-149

7

Mexico

Apr., 1954

-122

98

-106

-32

-30
-40

Morocco

Oct., 1959

129

-94

119

Pakistan

July, 1955

-21

-21

32

40
7

Peru
Philippines

1958

-117
-161

78

-47
27

-13
-90

18

Philippines

46
404

-60
-5

-15
66

-29

Spain

Nov., 1965
July, 1959

Tunisia

Sept., 1964

-56

68

-15

Turkey

Aug., 1958

-31

-44

73

-3
-2

Jan., 1962

38
-109
-124
-86

99

65

18
36
465

a Including errors and omissions and unilateral transfers
Note:
Source:

Columns (2) + (3) = (5) - (4) , except for rounding errors

'

International Financial Statistics and Pakistan Economic Journal,.
(March 1957)
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In sixteen cases there was an improvement in the net reserve position
(monetary balance is positive) in the year following devaluation, and in
seventeen cases the monetary balance showed an improvement over the year pre
ceding devaluation. Twelve of these latter cases also involved an improve
ment in the balance on goods and services.

Put another way, in six of the

nine cases in which the current account worsened~ this was more than com
pensated for by an increase in net capital inflows.

In summary, then, 21

of the 24 cases showed either an improvement in the current balance or an
improvement in the monetary balance, or both.

Only Colombia (1965), Korea

(1960), and Turkey experienced a worsening in both the current and the mone
tary balances. The Korean position showed substantial improvement after a
second devaluation the following year, however, while Colombia experienced
an export boom (excluding coffee) in 1965, our year of devaluation, follow
ing a devaluation applicable to non-traditiona l exports in late 1964.

Tur

key's exports performed very well following devaluation (see Table 4 below),
but an extensive liberalization program led to a sharp increase in imports.
On the face of it, this evidence seems to scotch the view that, in
general, devaluation will not work.
tion.

Positions did improve following devalua

On the other hand, the improvements are not so overwhelming as to

allay concern for any particular country, for in three or seven or nine
cases, depending on the criterion used, devaluation did not "work" in the
following year.
of Finance pause.

The proportion is substantial enough to give any Minister
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Before turning to a more analytical interpretation of the effects of de
valuation, one further bit of ex post evidence may be mentioned. The broad
coverage of Table 2 is confined (in most cases) to calendar years. For mer
chandise trade alone the time period of observation can be geared more accurate
ly to the time of devaluation.

Other things being equal, a devaluation should

reduce the volume and foreign-currency value of imports, and should increase
the volume of exports. Whether it increases or reduces the foreign-currency
value of exports depends upon domestic supply conditions and world demand
conditions regarding the devaluing country's exports combined with fairly
elastic supply will lead to a reduction in the value of exports; otherwise
the value should increase.
Table 3 sets out trade performance over the four quarters preceding
devaluation and over the four quarters following the quarter preceding de
valuation. The entries are percentage changes in the volume of exports and
imports, or in the dollar value when volume indexes were not available.

It

can be seen there that in 14 cases imports actually did fall following de
valuation, and in several other cases they rose negligibly; exports rose in all
but five cases. These developments accord with theoretical expectations for
an economy that is not growing and offer further evidence that devaluation
had a corrective influence, although in several cases speculation on the
prospect of devaluation may also have influenced the results in the indicated
directions.
This kind of post hoc ergo propter hoc analysis involves serious risk
of misinterpretation, however, for trade flows were clearly influenced by

-12aTable 3
Percenta ge Changes in Volume of Merchan dise Trade Four Quarters
Before and After Devalua tion

Country

Time of Devalua tion

Argentin a
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Greece
Iceland
Iceland
India
Israel
Korea

Termina l
Quarter

Exports
Before After

Imports
Before
After

Korea

Jan. 1959
Sept. 1964
1961-1962
Nov. 1962
Sept. 1965
Sept. 1961
July 1961
Apr. 1953
Feb. 1960
Aug. 1951
June 1966
Feb. 1962
Feb. 1960
Feb. 1961

Korea
Mexico

May 1964
Apr. 1954

I

24a

I

3

14

178

Morocco

Oct. 1959

III

n.a.

12

n.a.

30

Pakistan

July 1955
195Gb

II

8

-31

n.a.

10

11

n.a.
-15a

Jan. 1962
Nov. 1965
July 1959
Sept. 1964
Aug. 1958

IV

Peru
Philippi nes
Philippi nes
Spain
Tunis:f.a
Turkey
a
b

c

I7

II
I

III
II
II

II
I

IV
II
II

25
-9

-15
41

6

6

9

11

0

0

1

-39
-14

8

0

21
-17
-13
-2
-Sa

IV
IV

-3
9
-30a

IV

III
II
II

17

la

-5

-23
19
-17
-6

24

2l}

0

13
40a

-2
-20a
-6
16
23
-4
:-26a
-1

-8

43
-1

-2
_7C

187a

187a
la

70c
_7c

38a

-lOC

28c
_7c

oa

-8
-12
-],.Oa

n.a.

16
14

-8
2

-4

-10

n.a.

n.a.

II

Interna tional Financi al Statisti cs

-188

28
15
50a

Value (in foreign currency )
Before: 1957 to 1958; after: 1958 to 1959
Dollar value, excludin g aid-fina nced imports

Source:

2

_7a

n.a.
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factors other than currency devaluation.

In p2.rticular, it would be in

appropriate to credit devaluation with increases in export earnings that
merely reflect growth in world demand and that would have taken place without
the devaluation.

On the other hand, imports may be assumed to rise with

domestic income {and with relaxation of import control policies), and it
would be equally inappropriate to conclude that devaluation had failed on the
basis of income-induced increases in imports or increases resulting from im
port liberalization.
Table 4 offers a crude attempt to allow for the effects on exports of
the growth in world markets and for the effects on imports of changes in world
prices (presumed b~yond influence of the devaluing countries) and of changes
in domestic demand. Computed exports indicate what each country's merchandise
exports would have been in the calendar year following devaluation if it had
maintained the same share of the world market (by 3-digit SITC commodity
group) that it had in thS! year preceding devaluation.

3

Computed imports are

derived from imports in the c::ilendar year preceding devaluation by applying
an income elasticity of demand

4

for :f.mports to the actual growth in each

country's real income in the year following devaluation and, where data
permitted, by adjusting for changes in foreign prices of imports.
Actual exporto in the year following devaluation exceeded computed
exports in 14 inntances, and imports were lower than computed imports in 16
instances.

On the assu:::iption that national income did not decline in Costa

Rica in the year following devaluation, the trade balance improved over what
it would have been otherwise in 17 of the 24 cases, a somewhat better showing
than that in Column 2 of Table 2.

5

-14Table 4
1erchandise Exports and Imports
Year Before and After Devaluation
Compared with Computed Values for Year Following
($ million)
:

0

Imports

Exports
Before

Country

994

Argentina
Brazil
Canada
Colomb::l.a (1962)
Colomb:la(1965)

After
Computed Actual
1009
1088

Before
1233

After
Actual
Computed
1078a
933

Trade Balance
After
Actual
Computed
76
10

6193

1304
6741a

1096
6404

-510

499
-478

446
510

540
454

559a
484a

506
674

-65
147

-60
-164

107
94

n.a.
100a

113
85

n.a.
25

-20
58

296
88

-267
-30

-164
-21

1430
5811

1411
6231

1595
5926

1263

423
537

494
631

107

Costa Rica
Ecuador

84

86

127

125

93
143

Greece
Iceland (1960)

119
65

131
74

132
67

346
95

398
1048

71
Icefond (1961)
1687
India

83

84

75

84 8

89

-1

-5

1862

1603

2955

2740

-1152

-1137

Israd
Kc:rea(1960)

245

258

279

592

3014
643a

628

-385

-349

19

22

31

304

313

344

-291

-313

Kor9a(1961)

31

30

41

344

316

-332

-275

Korec1.(1964)
Mexico

87

96

119

515

362
556a

396

-460

-277

521

545

549

808

897

799

-352

-250

Morocco

329

369

354

326

334

413

35

Pakistan

400

398

340

290

315

417

83

-59
-77

Peru

281

278

312

334
677

347

294
654

-69
-169

-92

957
721

-72
-303

-136
4

245
469

-127
-90

-125
-114

P:1ilippin~s

530

551

562

794

872
529

821

125
246

120

~1962)
~
cs
t·hilippi
(1965)
Spain

501

Tur..~_nia

127

Turkey

247
a

725
355

894
795
244
315

Corrected for change in import prices

8

720
944a
832
252
336

8

18

-15-

This calculation makes no allowance for the stimulus to imports from
import liberalization. Of the 24 devaluations, ten involved a moderate to
extensive degree of import liberalization within the following twelve months.
Curiously, however, in eight of the ten cases (Table 5) the volume of imports
decl:i.ned in the four quarters following devaluation.

Import liberalization

was delayed three to twelve months in Iceland (1960), Israel, Korea (1964) 1
Spain, and Turkey, suggesting that the authorities waited to see how the
devaluation was going before they dared to relax controls on imports.

In

Korea, for example, imports rose sharply after the import liberalization of
early 1965.

Except in Colombia, however, it appears that the immed:!.ate

movement of imports was dominated by the devaluation or by depressions in
economic activity rather than by relaxation of controls over imports.

Table 5
Instances of Import Liberalization
Libe:raliz::tng
Count.~y

Volcme of Impo~ts
(percent change in four
quarters following quarter
preceding dEyaluat:lon)

Change in Balance
on Goods and Services
($ million)

-2
23

270

Argent:l.na

Colombia (1965)
Greece
Icel::md (1960)
India
Israel
Korea (1964)
Phil:!.ppines (1962)
Spain

Turkey
Source:

-1

-8
-1
-2
-7
-8
-10
5
Tables 3 and 2

-253
60
2

-35
-33
110
99
404
-31
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It should be emphasized here that devaluation cannot normally be ex
pected to have its principal, let alone its sole effects in the following
year. Expansion of exports and substitution for imports will often require
new investment, or at a minimum reorganization of existing productive
capacity (e.g. changing the pattern of land use).

For manufactured goods,

new exports may also require the development of foreign markets.
adjustments take time.

All these

What we have focussed on here are therefore merely

the impact effects of devaluation.

These are the effects, however, that

are usually of ~reatest interest and concern to those politically responsi•
ble for decisions to devalue.

III.

Devaluation and the Terms of Trade
An argument sometimes advanced against currency devaluation is that it

will turn the terms of trade against the devaluing country, thereby benefiting
the rest of the world at its expense. A worsened terms of trade is not a
necessary consequence of devaluation, however, and indeed for a country that
is sufficiently small relative both to its foreign sources of supply and to
its export markets, the terms of trade will be beyond its influence, hence
unchanged by devaluation. All of the countries considered here are "small"
in this sense relative to their sources of imports, but not necessarily to
their export markets:

Brazil's coffee prices may influence world coffee

prices, Argentina•s beef prices may influence ~orld beef prices, and so on.
Under these circumstances devaluation will genera.11y worsen the devaluing
country's terms of trade by lowering the (foreign currency) prices received
for its exports, the extent of the worsening depending not only on the price
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elasticity of foreign demand for the country's export products but also on
the devaluing country's elasticity of supply of exports -- the higher the
former and the lower the latter, the less likely will there be a deterioration
in the terms of trade. 6
Table 6 indicates the movement in foreign trade prices during the year
following 17 devaluations. The terms of trade deteriorated in seven of these
cases, and improved in nine.
unrelated to the devaluations;

Many of the price movements, however, were
it can be assumed that changes in dollar im

port prices and increases in dollar export prices were due to other factors.
Dollar export prices declined in seven instances, and these declines might
have been brought about by the devaluations;

but in only three cases

Canada, India, and Spain -- did the decline in export prices exceed 2 per
cent, and in the latter two cases the decline was small relative to the de
valuation. The general impression conveyed by these data is that the impact
of devaluation on the terms of trade is negligible for most less developed
countries. This result may, of course, have been achieved through actions
designed to prevent a deterioration, such as the imposition of export taxes.
Several countries here did impose taxes on their principal exports of primary
products. But these taxes were imposed primarily to tax away the windfall
profits that otherwise would have accrued to the producers, often landlords.
This is obviously the case for countries (e.g. Costa Rica) so small in the
world market that demand for their exports is highly elastic, where the terms
of trade cannot deteriorate; in other cases domestic supply of traditional pro
ducts (e.g. coffee, beef) is inelastic in the short run, so devaluation would
tend to raise domestic prices for these products rather than lower foreign prices.
Greece imposed export taxes on cotton, olive oil, and rice explicitly to hold
down the cost of living.

-18Table 6
Change in Foreign Trade Prices and Terms of Trade
in Four Quarters Following Devaluation
(percentage in dollar prices)
Terms of
Trade

Export
Prices

Import
Prices

11

-4

16

Brazil

4

3

1

Canada

-3

-1

Colombia (1962)
Colombia (1965)

-1
1

-5

-2
4

Country
Argentina

2

-4
-2
n.a.
n.a.
-p

48

-6a

-2
-1
10a

n.a.

n.a.

Costa Rica
Ecuador

-1

Greece

n.a.

Iceland (1960)
Iceland (1961)

-3

India
Israel

-2

Korea (1964)
Morocco

6

5

-la

-Ja

5

2
n.a.

2

1
2a

Philippines (1962)
Philippines (1965)

4

5

-2

3

-1
-5

Spain

-9

-8

-1

a

Calendar year following devaluation

Source:

International Financial Statistics

-19-

IV.

Devaluation and Aggregate Demand
Economies have frequently been observed to pause following a currency

devaluation, experiencing a slowdown in business activity and a rise in
unemployment.

These slumps at first glance are puzzling, since a successful

devaluation is conventionally regarded as expansionary in its effects, as
expenditure is switched from foreign to domestic goods, thereby stimulating
domestic business activity.

The observed slowdowns may of course be due

to developments unrelated to the currency devaluation, such as unusually bad
crops. This was an important factor depressing the Indian economy in 1966,
and it may also have been a factor following the Colombian devaluation of
late 1962.

Or the slowdowns may be due to overly stringent monetary and fiscal

policies that are undertaken along with devaluation, to assure that the trade
balance will improve and to reduce the dangers of a wage-price spiral follow
ing devaluation.
The currency devaluation may itself have a direct impact on the level
of aggregate demand, however, and that direct impact will not always be the
expansionary one conventionally assumed. This is obviously so when the current
account deficit worsens; in that case the public will be spending even more
on imports than it receives for exports than before devaluation, and expendi
ture on domestic goods and services, other things being

equal, will decline.

A special case of this phenomenon may arise when devaluation is accompanied
by import liberalization, with the result that imports absorb a larger amount
of domestic purchasing power.
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But devaluation may be deflationary -- in the relevant sense of reducing
total expenditure on domestic goods and services -- even when it succeeds
in reducing the current account deficit. Following devaluation, domestic
spending on imports may increase sharply even though the volume of imports
has fallen. This development will occur if the demand for imports is in
elastic, in which case devaluation acts much like an excise tax on tobacco
or liquor, increasing the price in terms of domestic currency, but not re
ducing the volume purchased proportionately.

Increases in such excise truces

are of course deflationary even though they raise the prices of the products
subject to tax.

The price elasticities implied in Tables 1 and 4 above

suggest that in the short run the demand for imports into less developed
countries is quite insensitive to price changes, a fact that should not be sur
prising given the heavy concentration of raw materials, foodstuffs, and capital
goods in their imports. For many less developed countrie§, those imports
potentially competitive with domstic production (implying a relatively high
degree of price substitution) have long ago been effectively excluded through
tariffs and other policies of import substitution.
The deflationary impact of the increase in domestic currency prices
of imports may of course be offset by an increase in incomes arising from
sales of exports. But if imports substantially exceed exports even after de
valuation, as they typically will for a capital-importing country, the excise
tax effect of devaluation on imports may more than offset increased spending
from enlarged incomes in the export section. 7

This deflationary impact pre-

supposes that at least some of the capital inflow, which after devaluation
commands larger amounts of domestic currency, is not immediately spent.
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The government recipient of a program loan to finance imports, for instance,
must sterilize the domestic currency proceeds arising from the sale of foreign
exchange, e.g. by retiring public debt held by the central bank.

In this

respect the monetary and expenditure effects of a devaluation are similar to
those of an increase in taxes not paralleled by an increase in government
expenditures.
Even when devaluation is deflationary, incomes will not fall if the de
flationary impact is more than offset by expansionary fiscal or monetary
action. And where policies are endemically expansionary, the deflationary
impact of devaluation will be a welcome antidote~

But in framing policies

to accompany devaluation the possibility that its direct effect may be de
flationary should be given more cognizance than it often is, so as to avoid
unnecessary deflation.
Table 7 indicates four magnitudes influencing aggregate demand in the
year following devaluation:

changes in the balance on goods and services

(measured in domestic currency), in government expenditure on goods and
services1 in tax revenues, and in the money supply. These recorded changes
are not entirely "exogenous" determinants of national output and income,
since as already noted the level of imports will be influenced by the level of
domestic spending as well as by devaluation and other factors, and of course
changes in tax revenues will also be influenced by changes in incomes as well
as by the new taxes and improved collection that often accompany devaluation.
Nonetheless, they give a rough indication of the impact on aggregate demand
of devaluation in comparison with that of other measures.

-22Table 7

Increases in Economic Aggregates from Year. Preceding Devaluation
(billions of national currency units)

Balance on•
Goods and Services

Country

Argentina

10.3

Brazil

.68

Canada

.09

Go'{ernment
Expenditure

35.2

Colomb:ta (1962)

-.98

.73
.59
.95

Colombia (1965)

-1.56

1.63

Costa Rica

Money
Supply a

Net Tax
Revenues

Government
Deficit

u.a.

n.a.

1.87

-1.14

3.22

•93

-.34

.62

2.08

51.3

1.17

.95

-.45

1.39

.081
.OS

-.035

.034

.074

-.040

.21

.29

.22

.07

Greece

<11

1.70

-1.25

.7.4:~:-~;

Iceland (1960)

-.0.9

.46
.36

• 1.. 2

-.06

.03

Iceland (1961)

.10

.31

~41

India

-.17

3.32

2,41

-.10
.91

.36
3.12

Israel

-.52

•27

,20

.07

.31

Ecuador

Korea (1960)

-6.0

4.0

2.2

1.8

.2

Korea (1961)

-4.2

7.9

1.7-

6.2

10 .1 _

Korea (1964)

-0.3

15.4

13.1

2.3

14.1

.46

1.36

1.16

.20

1.31

Morocco

-.15

,16

n.a.

n.a.

_.ss·

Pakistan

-.38

.20

-,24

.43

.70

Peru

2.2

Me}dco

1.1

·1.3

-0.2

P~ilippines (1962)

.07

.27

.26

.01

Philippines (1965).

.81

.19

.20

-.01

Spain
Tunisia

Turkey

22.7
-.025
-1.12

6.0

.015
1.35

12,5

-6.5

.018

-.003

.95

.40

1.14

.29
.18
1.2
.001

.61

aTwelve months starting with month preceding devaluation
Sourr:e:

U.• N. Yearbook of National Accounts Statts tiS-.E) and International
Financial Statistics
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The balance on goods and services when reckoned in domestic currency
actually worsened following devaluation in 14 instances, indicating deflationary pressure on the economy.

9

The worsening of the balance exceeded in-

creases in government expenditure in six instances, thus offsetting additional
expansionary pressures from that source; and in thirteen instances the
change in th~ balance plus the change in the government deficit indicate more
deflationary policies than in the year preceding devaluation.
The money supply was not allowed ~o fall in any of these countries in
the twelve months following devaluation, although the rise in Korea (1960),
Spain, and Tunisia was negligible.

Given the emphasis sometimes placed on the

need to maintain a tight control over credit to make a devaluation work, it
is noteworthy that for these devaluations the relationship between the per
centage increase in the money supply~ as a rough proxy for credit conditions,
and the percentage improvement in the balance on goods and services is a
very loose one indeed, and if a~ything shows a positive correlation (chart 1).
Devaluation can exert a deflationary impact on the economy in two other
ways.

When currency devaluation redistributes income from those segments of

the population with high propensities to spend on domestic goods and services,
those with low propensities to spend domestically, e.g. from wages to
ptofits or rents,

domestic demand will tend to fall.

The low spending group

may have a higher propensity to save or it may have a higher propensity to
spend on imported goods.

In the latter case devaluation-induced redistribu

tion may actually worsen the trade balance as well as causing deflation.

Chart 1

[mprovement in
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md Services as
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Relationship Between Change in Money Supply
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Dcfl~tionary redistributions seem to have been important in the declines
in economic activity following devaluation in Ar.gentina in 1959 and in Finland
in 1957.

10

It is unclear how general this phenomenon is. Typically real

wages do fall following devaluation, and some profits -- those in the export
and import-competing industries -- certainly rise. Whether this redistribution
typically leads to less spending, however, is more doubtful; investment
may be stimulated by the higher profits.

Deflationary redistribution is per

haps most likely when the principal exports are primary products, when the
elasticity of supply of those products is low in the short run, and when in
vestment for increased output is not stimulated by higher profits or rents.
As already noted, however, currency devaluation in these circumstances is
often accompanied by the imposition of new taxes on the exports of primary
products, thereby transferring to the government what would otherwise become
higher profits or rents.

These taxes are of course deflationary themselves,

eY.ccpt to the extent that the government quickly converts new revenues into
higher expenditures.
The third source of devaluation-induced deflationary pressure arises from
the presence of large private external debt, denominated in foreign currency.
Devalut>.tion will increase both the outstanding debt and the debt-servicing
burdca in terms of domestic currency.

The former development may throw some

firms a~d individuals into technical bankruptcy, and the latter will reduce
their net earnings.

On both counts private investment will be reduced, and

:1.ndeed if bankruptcy is sufficiently widespread a serious investment slump
could develop.

This factor is said to have been important in Argentina
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following the devaluation in 1962, when many firms that had borrowed liberally
and at high interest rates abroad for working capital as well as for capital
equipment found themselves with sharply increased obligations after the peso
11
was devalued from 83 to 130 per U.S. dollar.
Where external debt is significant, its presence may inhibit the economic
authorities from devaluing both for fear of generating bankruptcy and dis
rupting business and for fear of increasing the real value of the external
debt, the latter concern presupposing a deterioration in the terms of trade.

V.

Devaluation and the Wage-Price Spiral
An

oft-expressed fear concerning currency devaluation is that it will

generate round after round of price and wage increases that will nullify
the price advantages the devaluation is designed to give the country's pro
ducts in domestic and foreign markets. The increase in import prices, it is
said, will drive up the cost of living and this will stimulate demands for
higher wages, which in turn will raise domestic money costs and hence the
cost of living, and so on, in a vicious cycle, ultimately undercutting the
gains from devaluation.

Furthermore, imported goods may represent important

inputs into production for export, and devaluation in this case will directly
raise the production costs of exports.
The problem is more complex than this, and the

outcome depends in an

important way on the dynamics of response by wage-earners and businessmen
{including farmers) to higher costs and prices. The conditions required for
a complete negation of the price effects of devaluation are quite extreme.
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Devaluation does of course raise domestic prices of imports and export
products -- that is the mechanism whereby it improves the trade balance
and wages may well respond to the resulting increase in the cost of
12
living , thereby weakening the effects of devaluation . But nullificatio n
of these effects requires both that wage-earner s recoupe entirely their
standard of living through higher wages and that the real

value of other
income -- profits, rents, and taxes -- is also maintained. 13 This is
simply another way of saying that in order for an improvement to take place
in the balance on goods and services, the real expenditure of some segment
of the population -- wage-earner s, businessmen , landlords, or government -
must fall, and such a decline will ordinarily be achieved only if there is
a decline in the real income of some groups. 14
Partial reversal does not exhaust the range of possible outcomes.
On the one hand, devaluation may in fact result in very little change -- or
even a reduction -- in prices if it is used to replace already existing
import controls, subsidies to exports, and other devices to improve the
country's payments position.

Where imports have previously been restricted

by quotas or exchange licensing, devaluation will simply reduce importers'
profit margins, acting like a tax on unearned profits generated by the
artificial scarcity.

Under these circumstanc es there will be little or

no increase in prices, depending on the exact relationshi p of the devaluation
to the scarcity markups already being charged to the consuming public.

If

devaluation is accompanied by relaxation or removal of the quotas it will
increase the degree of competition in the economy, and this in turn may
actually lead to a reduction in prices, including prices of domestic goods
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with (previously controlled) import content.

15

Furthermore, if monopolistic

conditions prevail in the export industries, devaluation may serve to stimu
late output without leading to much increase in prices, by increasing the
elasticity of demand facing the exporters.

16

On the other hand, devaluation may also trigger the release of legal

or conventional restraints on other prices, as when devaluation is taken
as the excuse for raising urban bus fares.

Especially under circumstances

of suppressed inflationary demand, there are likely to be many prices that
do not reflect what the market will bear, for fear of public opprobrium
or legal sanctions or even just out of ignorance or inertia or implied
contracts on the part of the sellers of goods and services. Devaluation may
provide the occasion for a general

reassessment of pricing practices and

recontracting, thus stimulating price increases that could have taken place
earlier (and are likely to take place sooner or later), but did not.

In

this case, domestic costs could rise by more than the amount of the devalua
tion.
It should be noted that monetary and fiscal policies play a crucial
role in clstR:rm:in:ing the extent to which the relative price effects of devalua
tion are offset by increases in domestic costs. Without monetary expansion
to "validate" increased money wages and prices, demand would fall and un
employment would result. The dynamics of response to devaluation thus can
influence the ultimate impact of devaluation on the country's trade posi
tion.

Ideally, devaluation will in the first instance raise local currency

prices and hence profits in the export and import-competing industries.
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This in turn will stimulate those .industries to expand, both by hiring
additional labor and by increasing investment in capacity (or, in the case
of agricultural output, new planting).

Labor will be bid ·away from the

non-trade sectors of the economy, possibly with some increase in wages,
which the trade sector can afford to pay out of its higher profits, and
this will tend to pull up money wages throughout the economy -- but as a
result of expansion of the foreign trade sector.
An alternative course of events io far less favorable.

It arises if

the foreign trade sector fails to expand output in response to devaluation,
either because of misguided efforts to preserve the status quo or because
the gestation period for new investment is longer than the increased pro
fits from devaluation are expected to last.

If then wage-earners respond

to increases in the cost of living and to higher profits in the foreign trade
sector by demanding, and getting, higher money wages, this will tend to
pull up wages throughout the economy. But since profits in the non-trade
sectors have not risen (on the contrary, the costs of their import re
quirements have risen) , they ca.n meet the enlarged wage demands only by
charging higher prices for their output or by releasing workers. At this
point the monetary authoriUes are confronted with a cruel dilemma:

they can

maintain tight monetary control, thereby inhibiting price increases but also
inducing unemployment, or they can ease up on monetary conditions, thereby
validating the increases in wages and domestic prices and undercutting the
relative price effects of the devaluation. Thus the speed with which output
and employment in the trade sector is increased as compared with the
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speed with which workers demand and get higher money wages can be a critical
factor in determining the extent to which a devaluation will succeed.
It is difficult to get good evidence on the influence of devaluation
on prices and wages, partly because tlerelevant information on wages and
prices is often non-existent or of poor quality, partly because movements
in wages and prices are influenced by many other factors, such as harvest
conditions and productivity growth in the manufacturing sector. Table 8
indicates price and wage movements, where data are available, for twelve
months from the month preceding the month of devaluation.

Price and wage

movements beyond that time will of course continue to be influenced by
the events set in motion by devaluation, but as time progresses other,
unrelated, factors play an increasingly dominant role. Data are given for
the domestic prices of imported goods, the general wholesale price index,
the consumer price index, and wages in manufacturing, with data of the first
and last type available for only about half the countries. For comparison,
the first column shows the extent of devaluation as it should affect the
local currency price of imported goods at the port of entry.

17

The evidence in Table 8 clearly suggests that devaluation does lead
to an increase in prices, and at least indirectly to an increase in wages,
but that increases in the cost of living and in wages are far less than
the devaluation -- with the notable exception of Colombia in 1962.

In

no case, however, did the consumer price index decline, and the wholesale
price index declined onlyinCosta Rica.

In six instances the consumer price

index increased less in the twelve months following devaluation than it had
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Price and Wage Increases in the 12 Months
Following Devaluation
(percent)
Country

a Importb Wholesale Consumer Manufacturing
Time of Devaluation Devaluation Prices
Prices
Prices
Wages

Argentina
Brazil
Canadad
Colombia
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Greece
Iceland
Iceland
India

Jan. 1959
Sept. 1964
1961-1962
Nov. 1962
Sept. 1965
Sept. 1961
July 1961
Apr. 1953
Feb. 1960
Aug. 1961
June 1966

156
156

180

11

6

30
33
6

Israel
Korea
Korea

62
49C

103

33
49

115
53
3
32
18

3

-1

5

69
69
12
37

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
41

2
28

12
15

Feb. 1962
Feb. 1960

35
51

n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
15

56

14

10

Korea
Mexico
Morocco
Pakistan
Perue

Feb. 1961
May 1964
Apr. 1954
Oct. 1959
July 1955
1958

100
45
14
39
45

36
n.a.
15
n.a.
n.a.

12
19
16
n.a.
61

Philippines
Philippines
Spain

Jan. 1962
Nov. 1965
July 1959

19

9

9

6

9

n.a.

4

9

8

35

3

1

1

n.a.

Tunisia
Turkey

Sept. 1964
Aug. 1958

20

21
27

17
25

11
32

n.a.

a
b

19

64

n.a.

6

67
5

41
20

6

37
14
13c
5

22
n.a.
n.a.
13

9

14

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
10
16
8

13

18

17
4

16
Sc
4C

26

llc

6

k/(1-k), where k i s the effective devaluation for imports shown in
Table 1.
In local currency

c Calendar year
d May 1961 to May 1963
e Dec. 1957 to Dec. 1959
Sources: International Financial Statistics, U.N. Monthly Bulletin
of Statistics, and I.L.O., Year Book of Labour Statistics

in the twelve months preceding devaluation, and that relationship also
occurred in six instances with wholesale prices, including five cases -
Brazil, Ecuador, India, and Korea in 1961 and 1964--common to both groups.
Import liberalization helped to hold down price increases in a number
of countries, most notably in Korea (1964), the Philippines and Spain.

But

even in the absence of import liberalization, price increases would be
moderated to the extent that the higher cost of foreign exchange was absorbed
by declines in importers' margins, as they might be if artificial scarcities

(e.g. through import quotas or foreign exchange licensing) had already led
to high local prices for imports. A comparison of the first two columns of
Table 8 shows that import prices did generally rise less than the amount of
effective devaluation, suggesting a sharp drop in importers' marg:!.ns and
reflecting import liberalization where it occurred.

But the data on 1.mport

prices are too fragmentary and the data in both columns are of such uncer
tain quality that no strong case can be made.

It is noteworthy, however,

that in eleven instances the wholesale price index rose more sharply than
the consumer price index, despite a normal expectation for the op-;.,ooite
to occur

because of the wage component in consumer prices. This may be due

in part

to the greater importance of imports in the wholesale price index,

but it may also suggest that scarcity markups we~e trimmed following de
valuation.

(Where consumer prices rose much more than wholesale prices,

as in Colombia (1962), it suggests that devaluation may have triggered other
price increases, not directly related to increased costs of imported goods.)
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The hypothesis that markups on imports were sharply reduced following
devaluation is further supported by the month-to-month pattern of import
prices following devaluation.

In the months immediately following devalua

tion, import prices in local currency rise sharply as importers attempt to
pass the full increase in the cost of foreign exchange on to their customers.

A peak is reached after two or three months, however, and prices of imported
goods fall subsequently for several months, as importers find that the
market will not support the higher prices -- they had already been extract
ing scarcity prices before the devaluation, and this limited the extent
to which buyers would pay more after devaluation without a sharp drop in
supplies.

Unfortunately few countries compile data on the local currency

prices of imports, butthis time pattern could be observed, among those that
do, in Colombia (1965), India, Morocco, Spain, and after the South Vietnamese
devaluation of 1966.
Data on wages are sparse and of low quality. Where such data do exist,
they indicate an increase in the year following devaluation by rather more
than in the preceding.

But in nine out of eighteen cases wage increases rose

by less than the increase in consumer prices, despite a normal expecta-

tion, in a growing economy, for wage increase;to exceed increases in the
cost of living.

Moreover, the wage figures available are for manufacturing,

and these probably increased rather more rapidly than labor incomes generally,
since manufacturing labor is usually better organized and it is working in
a sector (unlike the service sector) that should benefit from devaluation.
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On only two occasions did wage increases approach (and exceed) the degree
of devaluation. Thus it appears that wage increases do not generally under
cut the relative price effects of devaluation, and often real wages actually
fall.
Prices, like the level of economic activity, are influenced by factors
other than devaluation.

On the classical view, price level increases are

largely determined by changes in the money supply. To hold the price level
unchanged following a devaluation would require a fall in prices of non
trade goods and services, and to bring that about would in most countries
require an unacceptable degree of monetary deflation. Where agricultural
output is a significant portion of total output, as it typically is in less
developed countries, variations in farm production will also have an im
portant influence on prices. Again the price level could be held steady in
times of poor harvest by sufficiently stringent monetary deflation, but
again such deflation is likely to be politically unacceptable.

.

The combined effects of devaluation, changes in the money supply (M),
and VEl.riations in food production (F)on wholesale

cih

and consumer (C)

prices are indicated in the following cross-sectional regressions, which
implicitly assume the same economic structure (e.g. ratio of trade to non
trade sector) for all the 21 and 19 countries included in the two re
~ressions. The variables are all percentage changes, and standard errors of
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.

w = 2.83 + 0.32
( .14)

c=

-0.41 + .42
( .10)

(~)

1-k

+ 0.38

.

i'1

( .33)
k
(1-k) + 0.24 M

(.25)

0.70 F

R2

= .59

(.39)

.

0.71 F

R2 = . 78

(.28)

the estimated coefficient s are in parentheses . The regressions show that
~

average wholesale prices rise by less than a third of the devaluation ,

with a somewhat greater impact on consumer prices; that increases in the
money supply increase prices, but (in a period following devaluation ) not
18
and that changes in food production have a
by a correspondi ng amount;
substantial impact on both wholesale and consumer prices. In all, over
three quarters of the variation in consumer prices and nearly three-fifth s
of the variation in whole prices could be "explained" by these three
variables, although of course this type of evidence is only suggestive,
not definitive.
A number of countries hold down the impact of devaluation on consumer
prices, and hence presumably also on wages, by subsidizing major items in
the cost of living or by imposing price controls. India in 1966 and Korea
in its various devaluation s maintained price controls, while Colombia in
1965 continued to allow imports of major consumer items to enter at the
pre-devalua tion exchange rate for some months following devaluation .

When

multiple exchange rates are in effect, the latter practice is common.
Typically, however, price controls are relaxed and special exchange rates
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are reduced or removed within a year following devaluation, so these de
vices are only partially reflected, if at all, in the observed price changes
recorded in Table 8.
To sum up, the worst fears concerning ~age-price spiraling as a result
of de?aluation are unfounded.

Only Colombia (1962) and possibly Costa Rica

represent exceptions, and in the former case a serious decline in food
prodection greatly aggravated the increase in the cost of living.

Indeed,

harvest fluctuations generally seem to play an important role in deter
mining the cost of living,and devaluations are less likely to be negated by
wage increases if they are undertaken in years of good harvest. Finally,
real wages fell following devaluation in a majority of the cases considered
here--and real wages were undoubtedly reduced from what they otherwise would
have been in most of the other cases--a development that is required in the
short run if devaluaiton is to lead to the necessary reallocation of re
sources to the export and import-competing industries. This does not always
imply a long-run reduction in real wages, for where the foreign trade in
dustries are relatively labor intensive, real wages will ultimately be in
creased by devaluation.

VI.

Political Effects of Devaluation
Even if devaluation works, policy makers may shy away from it on

political grounds.

National prestige and local pride are frequently factors

inhibiting resort to currency devaluation, but an even more important de
terrent is the expectation that it will spell political suicide for those
responsible for the decision.
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A simple test of the political consequences of devaluation is whether
the government -- in particular the prime minister or president -- remained
in power during the following twelve months. There are obvious weaknesses
with this test. First, a government may have fallen just before devaluation,
as a result of economic mismanagement or for other reasons, leaving its
successor the opportunity to blame the necessity for devaluation on the
fallen government.

Or a government may have delayed the devaluation to a

time which it thought politically safe. Finally and most important, de
valuation is often a necessary consequence of economic mismanagement, and
it is really the mismanagement, rather than the devaluation, that is and
should be the target of political criticism. Thus even when devaluation is
in fact the most appropriate remedy, it may be confused with the disease,
either by the public or in evaluating the response of the public.
Seven out of the 24 governments involved in this study fell in the
year following devaluation.

In five of these seven cases the political

change appears to have been unrelated to the devaluation. The King of
Morocco removed his prime minister because of the latter's liberal and
modernizing inclinations. General Park's 1961 coup in Korea involved a
much broader range of issues than devaluation, although mismanagement of
the economy may have contributed to the general dissatisfaction.

Costa

Rica and Colombia (1965) both experienced orderly changes of government,
19
predictable on past experience even without the devaluations , although
economic issues were important in both cases.

In the Philippines (1965)

President Macapagal was voted out despite his attempt to woo the business
community through devaluation of the export rate three days before the
election.
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In both Peru and Ecuador, however, economic mismanagement leading to
the necessity of currency played a substantial role in the change of
government.

20

Economic policy played a substantial role in the loss of

parlimentary strength of the Conservative Party in Canada in 1962, but the
government held on for more thana,year. The Congress Party in India also
lost ground in 1966 over its

economic policies.

In Israel the devaluation

and associated policies led to a hotly debated motion of no confidence,
but the government survived it. And in Turkey the coup of 1960 followed
strong and widespread dissatisfaction with economic policy, but that change
fell outside the arbitrary limit of twelve months set here.
It might be thought that the tactics used in devaluing a currency
will influence the chance of political survival, and in particular that re
sort to piecemeal devaluation may be less of a threat to those in power than
a sharp, once-for-all change in rate. The nature of this study precludes a
careful examination of this possibility, for the observations under con
sideration all involved fairly substantial changes relative to the periods
immediately preceding and following. It is perhaps worth noting, however,
that in four of the seven cases in which the government fell a formal, de jure
change in parity was involved. Two other cases involved de facto changes in
a major rate with no change in parity. And Peru had a depreciating flexible
exchange rate.
Governments of course change even without devaluations, and some
standard of comparison is needed to determine whether seven out of twenty
four - twenty-nine percent - is a large or a small number of government
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changes within a twelve month period. To provide such a comparison, a random
sample was chosen from the period 1950-1965 of countries that did not de
value within a calendar year. In this sample, 14 percent of the governments
were changed. It thus appears that currency devaluation, or at least the con
ditions leading to the necessity for devaluation, roughly doubles the likeli
hood of loss of power by the government undertaking the devaluation. This
chance still remains less than one in three, however, even including changes
in government in which devaluation does not seem to have been an issue.
As might be expected, finance ministers fared rather worse than
governments:

fourteen failed to stay in their jobs during the twelve

months following devaluation. Seven of these of course went with their
governments, but an additional seven -- in Argentina, Colombia (1962),
India, Korea (twice), Pakistan, and the Philippines -- were ousted or
left even when the governments stayed. Again, sometimes the change was not
related specifically to devaluation.

In March 1963 the entire Colombian

cabinet resigned on a political issue, for instance, and Korean ministries
were in constant flux throughout this period. A randomly selected control
seven
group suggests that/out of forty finance ministers in non-industrial countries
-- eighteen percent --

may be expected to change in a twelve-month

period even without devaluation.

Thus devaluation seems to increasesubstantially the

possibility that the finance minister of the devaluing country will lose
his job -- the percentages of tne financa ministers that were changed in
our two sactiples, one \-.Tith devaluation an-d the other without, differ by a
factor of three.
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VII. Conclusions and Recommendations
Any conclusions drawn from this examination of two dozen currency de
valuations must be highly tentative, for the reasons given earlier. The
data are poor. Each country is unique in its economic structure and in
its response to sharp changes, such as devaluation bring;about, in its
domestic price structure and in its monetary relations with the rest of the
world.

Wage costs and prices, aggregate demand, and trade flows are all

subject to a wide range of influences other than currency devaluation.
Precisely because of these weaknesses, however, generalizations from
one or two devaluations are especially hazardous. There is some safety in
numbers.

Inspection of two dozen cases filters out some of the unique

elements that exist in each instance, and provides some assurance against
gross error arising from poor data.

However, it also requires that the

level of explanation and interpretation must be more general and less pre
cise than would be permitted by case studies

in depth.

With these qualifications, the following generalizations can be
made:
First, currency devaluation seems to be successful, in the sense of
improving the balance on goods and services.

To be sure, the price

elasticities implied by the degree of improvement are quite low, but they
are high enough for success.

Some of the apparent exceptions to this

generalization can be explained by other (possibly related) factors, such
as a sharp increase in the inflow of capital following devaluation.

Ad

ditional foreign aid would permit more generous import licensing, even in
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the absence of a general import liberaliz ation program; and additiona l
direct investmen t might raise imports directly.

In a few cases, however,

devaluati on simply failed to have its intended effects.

The one-year period

used to measure performan ce of course offers far too little time for the
full effects of devaluati on, which may require investmen t in new capacity,
tG work themselve s out. This fact gives greater weight to the high pro
portion of "successe s" in th! year following . The first year following de
valuation is however, the period of greatest concern to those responsib le
for making the decision.
Second, quite apart from monetary and fiscal policies, devaluati on
itself often initially tends to depress economic activity in the devaluing
country, contrary to what has normally been expected. This effect may arise
from devaluati on-induce d shifts in the distribut ion of income from low to
high savers; or it may arise from the large drain on domestic purchasin g
power created by a rise in the local-cur rency prices of imports, in circum
stances in which imports exceed exports and the price elasticit y of demand
for imports is rather low -- both condition s typically found in less de
veloped countries .
Third, devaluati ons, even large devaluati ons, do not seem to worsen
the devaluing country's terms of trade.

Most of the countries considere d

here apparentl y account for too small a portion of the world market for
devaluati on-induce d changes in the terms of trade to be a serious considera 
tion.
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Fourth, currency devaluation does stimulate increases in local prices
of goods and services closely linked with foreign trade; these include ex
port products and local production in competition with imports,as well as
imports.

It is also accompanied by larger than nonnal wage increases. But

rarely is the increase in wages and other local costs great enough to nullify
the effects of devaluation, at least within the following twelve months.
Unrelated events, such as bad harvests, cara reduce considerably even the
long run benefits from devaluation by contributing to an inordinate rise
in the cost of living and hence in wages. This seems to have been a key,
factor in the instances in which the effects of devaluation were substantially
weakened by increases in local costs.
Finally, a decision to devalue does not typically spell political
demise for governments that undertake it, but devaluation does seem to be
associated with a somewhat higher likelihood of a fall in the government.
The chance that a finance minister will lose his job is substantially higher.
No clear-cut recommendations emerge from the study, except that con
side1:c:1.ble attention should be paid to the economic environment before a
decision to devalue is made. The short-run effects of devaluation can be
greatly complicated and the long-run effects substantially weakened if it
is ac~ompanied by a poor harvest, if it is accompanied by a sudden release
of prices that have been hitherto controlled by law or convention, or if
it is immediately followed by a major wage settlement.

In all of these

cases, increases in wages and other costs are made more likely and will re
duce the relative price shifts that the devaluation is designed to bring
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about. A delay in wage response to devaluation is likely to mean a lower
overall increase in money wages (but not necessarily in real wages) in the
long run.
The price and wage effects of devaluation may be mitigated if import
controls are relaxed simultaneously.

Historically there has often been a

delay of several months or more before import liberalization is undertaken,
and by then some of the demage may have been done. Early import liberaliza
tion will serve both to moderate:increases in local prices and, by absorbing
more local purchasing power through expenditure on imports, it will also
exert some deflationary pressure on the economy.
Finally, however, where analysis suggests that devaluation reinforced
by liberalization is likely to exert a strong deflationary impact on the
economy, it might be accompanied by relatively early offsetting monetary
expansion.

Early expansion will help to avoid unnecessary unemployment and

excess capacity and it should thereby forestall the inevitable political
demands for economic expansion later.

Delayed expansionary policy may come

into play just as the devaluation itself is also providing some domestic
expansion, and together they may exert undesirable upward pressure on local
wages and prices well after the devaluation.

On the other hand, such "fine

tuning" may not be possible given our still quite imperfect understanding
of the dynamics of response to devaluation or other major policy changes.
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Appendix A
Calcula tion of Effectiv e Devalua tion
As noted in the text, the change in a currenc y's par value does not
necessa rily imply a correspo nding change in the cost to importe rs of foreign
exchange and the local proceeds to exporte rs arising from their foreign
currency sales.

Multiple rates may be changed by differin g amounts ,

tariffs may be changed as part of a policy package, certain imports may
be subsidiz ed for a period followin g devalua tion, or pre-dev aluation export
subsidie s may be reduced or removed. The effectiv e devalua tion for a
particu lar commodity should take into account all of these factors. 1 Un
fortunat ely such calculat ions would be tedious in their detail for coun
tries with complic ated changes in their exchange rates, even if the requisit e
data were readily availai le, which they are not. The figures for Greece and Israel,
however , reflect1 such

calculat ion by Eliades and Riemer, respecti.ve 1Y• 2

A simple and expedie nt, though imperfe ct, shortcu t was adopted here.
Where countrie s record the value of their foreign trade both in foreign and in
local currency , an implici t weighted average exchange rate for a given
period can be derived from the two sets of figures, where the weights are
the value of exports or imports subject to the various exchange rates.
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The change:; in effective rates recorded in Table lwere derived from these
average implicit rates on exports and imports,calculated for the month pre
ceding the month of devaluation and for the month following the month of
devaluation. This procedure should not introduce a downward bias because
of devaluation-induced changes in the composition of trade, sincethese
periods·

'are too close to the devaluation for trade composition to be much

affected by it.

But of course the procedure is subject to error where the

composition of trade subject to different rates has changed sharply for
other reasons.

Moreover, this procedure does not in all cases incorporate

changes in import duties, for the local currency value of imports may be
recorded exclusive of duties. The figure for Canada is adjusted to make
allowance for its import surcharges.

In a few cases--Brazil, the Philip

pines (1962), and Spain -- the change in multiple rates extended over a
period longer than one month, and a correspondingly longer interval has
been included here.
Where monthly trade data were not available in both foreign and
domestic currency, or where one series is artificially derived from the
other by use of the exchange parity, balance-of-payments data (in foreign
currency) and national accounts data (in local currency) were used in
stead. This has the twofold disadvantage as compared with the former pro
cedure that balance-of-payments and national accounts data are typically
available only on an annual basis, and the definition of "goods and ser
vices" in the two accounts is not always identical.
thus introduced.

Also, for

Turkey

calculation only for net exports. ·

Further errors are

this technique permitted a
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Finally, India and Morocco lack either foreign-currency balance-of
payments data or exports in the GNP accounts, so even this technique
could not be used, but known reductions in import surcharges are de
dc.cted from the nominal devaluation.
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Appendix B
Devaluation and Aggregate Demand
Devaluation is normally aimed at improving a country's balance-of
payments position and especially its balance on goodR and services.
rn assessing its success it is therefore appropriate to focus on the coun
try's earnings and payments in terms of foreign currency. But the impact of
devaluation on total demand within the devaluing country depends on the
resulting increase in receipts for exports and payments for imports in
terms of domestic currency, since that is the unit in which inco1:ie~ are
earned expenditure s made.
For a country with a unified exchange rate the relationshi p between
a given balance on goods and services in

foreign currency and in domestic

currency is B = rD, where Bis the balance in foreign currency, Dis the
balance in domestic currency, and r is the exchange rate indicating the
foreign currency price of a unit of domestic currency. The change in the
foreign-curr ency balance following currency devaluation is then:
(1)

6B

= (r+6r)6D

+ 6rD

= r(l-k)6D

- kB

Here 6 indicates a change in the variable it precedes, and k =-6r/r,
the proportiona te change in exchange rate (taken to be positive for de
valuation) •
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A devaluation is assumed to be successful if, other things being
equal, the balance in terms of foreign currency improves (8B is positive).
Relationship (1) shows that when the devaluing country has an initial de
ficit on goods and services (B<O), a successful devaluation will reduce
total demand (8D<O) rather than increase it, as is usually assumed, if
improvement in the balance in foreign currency falls short of the initial
deficit

times the porportionate devaluation (i.e., 8B<-kB). Even when the

improvement is greater than this, the stimulus to aggregate demand will be
substantially less than the improvement in the foreign-currency balance
converted into domestic currency.

This is because residents after de

valuation must pay more in local currency for a dollar's worth of imports,
thereby enlarging the absorption of local purchasing power by the import
surplus.
These conditions can be reformulated in terms of price elasticities,
measuring the responsiveness of demand and supply of exports and imports
to changes in relative prices.

1

On the assumption that the devaluing

country is too small to influence the dollar prices of its imports and
that the local currency supply price of its exports is unchanged by de
valuation, the following table indicates the range of import demand
elasticities for which a small successful devaluation will be deflationary,
for various values of export demand elasticities and the ratio of exports
to imports.
1. See my "Devaluation and Aggregate Demand," Yale Economic Growth
Center Discussion Paper No. 55, June 1968,mimeo.
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Table B-1
Range of Import Demand Elasticity for which
Successful Devaluation will be Deflationary

Initial
Trade Ratio

0.5
.9
.8
.7
.6

.5

.45
.40
.35
.30
.25

-

Note:

1.0

.55
.60
.65
.70
.75

0
.1
0 - .2
0 - .3
0 - .4
0 - .5

1.5

0 - .10
0 - .25

Table computed for perfectly elastic
supply of exports and imports.

If exports face increasing costs the range of elasticities will be
lower than those indicated.

The middle area in Chart 1 shows the demand

elasticity region in which successful devaluation will be deflationary,
drawn on th13 WJsumption that tbe rorcir;,1 currency prices of iP,portG are
unLdluenccd by devaluation and that the elasticity of supply of exports
is t1..ro.

On these assumptions, any combination of demand elasticities in the

shaded area will lead to an improvement in the balance on goods and services
in foreign currency but- to a deterioration of the balance in domestic
currency, hence to deflationary pressures.
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Chart 1

Price Elasticity of Demand
for I ports
1.0
X
M

Many less developed countries are likely to satisfy the conditions
under which devaluation will have a negative effect on aggregate ·demand,
at least in the period immediately following devaluation . As capital-sho rt
countries, most of them have continuing deficits on goods and services,
matched by long-term capital inflows. As countries which have pursued
policies of import substitutio n, most of them have shifted the composition
of their imports from finished products to raw materials, intermediat e
products, and capital goods, thereby lowering the price elasticity of
demand for imports.

Import controls reinforce this reduction in price

sensitivity.

Finally, most of the less developed countries experience

supply constraints in the short run, so the volume of exports cannot be
increased substantially until some time has elapsed.

In the short run, the

demand elasticity for exports is also likely to be small. Thus a deflationary impact is lt!-':.C!l7, D-lthoug:~ it may be merely a ::.:hart-run phenomenon.
Where devaluation is accompanied by trade liberalization, its success
should be measured by the improvement over the current balance that woulrl
have prevailed with liberalization in absence of the devaluation. By en
larging the "pre-devaluation" deficit, trade liberalization therefore in
creases the likelihood that devaluation will be deflationary.
Whether devaluation is in fact deflationary depends also on the nature
and treatment of the long-term capital inflows.
fixed in terms of local currency (as some private

If capital inflows are
inflows might be), de

valuation will reduce foreign currency receipts on capital account and a
"successful" devaluation must improve the balance on goods and services by
more than enough to cover this reduction. Such an improvement is more likely
to add to aggregate domestic demand.

It will necessarily do so if such

capital inflows exactly cover the initial trade deficit. This can be seen
by modifying relationship (1) to include capital inflows K.
(2)

6(B+K) = r(l-k)6D - kB - kK

If K = -B initially, the last two expressions on the right cancel, and a
successful devaluation requires 6D
undertaken only to build net

>

O.

But such a devaluation would be

reserves; continuing capital inflows do not

usually cover the current deficit of a devaluing country.

If the capital inflow is fixed in terms of foreign currency , as is
likely to be true for foreign aid receipts , then the earlier analysis
holds, except to the .extent that the larger domestic currency proceeds
from the foreign aid stimula te correspo ndingly larger domestic expendi 
tures.

Thus the budgetar y treatmen t of foreign aid counter part funds and

the closenes s of the link between budgetar y receipts and government expendi 
tures are importan t conside rations in assessin g the impact of devalua tion
on domestic demand.
For multiple exchange rates and differe ntial changes in rates, the
simplic ity on relation ship (1) gives way to more complex relation ships,
but no new principl es are introduc ed.

If the devalua tion affectin g im-

ports exceeds that for exports , devalua tion is more likely to be deflatin nary,
whereas the reverse is true if the devalua tion for exports is greater
than that applicab le to imports.
This analysis assumes that the monetary authori ties neutrali ze the
domestic monetary effects of any balance- of-paym ents deficit, but that they
do not offset the domestic monetary effects of the enlarged domestic
currency absorpti on (e.g. by a government receivin g foreign assistan ce)
resultin g from devalua tion.
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Appendix C
Pr!ce-Wage Spiraling
Devaluation will typically have secondary repercussions on other
costs, thereby weakening--but rarely reversing--the effects of the devaluation on international cost co;,i1)etitiveness. iJevaluatiou may thus

stit0ulate

some

cost ioflation, out

ttie

process 11ill normally be self-limiting.

To see this, suppose that the direct and indirect importance of im
ports, import-competing goods, and exports in the cost-of-living index is

m. A proportionate devaluation by k (measured in terms of dollars per
unit of local currency) will, therefore, increase the cost-of-living index

~ k)m, on the assumption that world prices for the devaluing country's
1
imports and exports are unaffected by the devaluation. (If world prices

by (

of the country's exports fall, or if the devaluation induces a drop in m,
the increase in the cost of living will be correspondingly lower.)
Suppose further that "workers" respond to an increase in the cost
of-living by demanding a wage increase in proportion p and suppose that
wages account, directly and indirectly, for a fraction w of total domestic
costs. Then domestic costs will be increased by an amount (

1

: k) mpw. But

this will in turn raise the cost-of-living further, by an amount

( 1 ~ k)mpw(l - m). The induced rise in cost-of-living will in turn set
off another round of wage increases, and so on, ad infinitum. The ultimate
increase in the cost-of-living (P) will be:
k

2 2

P = m(y-:-k) [1 + pw(l - m) + p w (1 - m)

2

+ .•• ] =
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This is an infinite series, but it does not result in an infinite increase
in the cost-of-liv ing so long as pw(l - m) is less than unity.

If workers

attempt to restore all of the loss in real income resulting from devalu
ation, p = 1, and if "workers 11 include not only wage-earner s but also
salaried persons, businessmen , rentiers, and government enterprises , w
may cover the whole of domestic costs (w = 1).

In this extremely unfavorable

case, the only restraint on induced price increases is, ironically, the
"import" content (including import-comp eting goods and exports) of the
cost-of-liv ing, for which by assumption domestic prices are unchanged after
the devaluation to a new fixed exchange rate, since they are determined in
the world market.
The working out of this ultimate increase in the cost-of-liv ing will
of course take considerabl e time, and it will not occur before other
disturbance s--good or bad harvests, changes in world prices, etc.--interv ene.
The ultimate increase in costs (C) of tradable goods resulting from
the devaluation will be:
mpwx
1 - pw(l-m) ],
where n is the direct and indirect import content in exports and import
competing goods and w is the direct and indirect share of wages in their
X
total (not merely domestic) costs.

In general, n will not be the same as

m. For simplicity, exports and import-comp eting goods have been lumped
together.
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It can be easily shown that so long asp is no greater than unity,
C can never exceed the amount of the devaluation,

k

1 _ k.

But if

p = w = 1 and w = 1 - n, the original price relationships between tradable
X
and non-traded goods will be restored, and the devaluation will be thwarted.
Put another way, to improve the trade balance, devaluation must cut the

real income

expenditure

of some group, be it workers, capitalists,

or government.
Under some circumstances p may exceed unity. This would be the case
where some wage or profit increases were overdue but were restrained by
law, custom, fear of public opprobrium, or for other reasons.

Devaluation

may then remove the restraint or provide a publicly acceptable occasion
for ignoring it, even though the rise in import prices is not directly
involved. Where this is the case, devaluation might actually weaken the
devaluing country's relative cost position.
In all cases discussed here, substantial and generalized "wage" in
creases cannot be sustained without the tacit cooperation of the monetary
authorities; they must supply additions to the money supply to support
higher price and wage levels. But wage increases may take place initially
without this tacit cooperation, thereby confronting the monetary authori
ties with a painful choice between supporting the wage and price increases
to maintain employment levels or preserving monetary restraint with the
consequence of higher unemployment.
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*This paper was sponsored

by the Agency for International

Development under its Summer Research Program, but A.I.D. bears
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1

For a discussion of the

11

disequilibrium system" used by

many less developed.coun tries, see C. P. Kindleberger, "Liberal
Policies vs. Controls in the Foreign Trade of Developing Coun
tries," AID Discussion Paper No. 14, 1967, published in Theberge,
J.D. (ed.), Economics of Trade and Development, Wiley

&

Sons,

1968.
2

rn Canada and Peru the exchange rate floated downward

steadily for abouta year, ending respectively in May 1962 and
April 1959.

In these two cases the "previous year" is assumed

to be 1961 and 1958, respectively.
3

)'c

Specifically, X. = E Xi.Ri , where Ri represents theratio
J
i
J
of total. imports of 3-digit commodity group i into the OECD
countries in the year following devaluation to those of the
preceding year, Xij is the value of exports of i by devaluing
country j in the year preceding devaluation, and X.* is the comJ

puted level of exports for j.

This formulation automatically

allows for any change in world prices for the export products
of the devaluing countries.
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4

Income elasticities cf de:naad for imports were taken from

Hollis Cher.ery and Alan Strm,t, "Foreign Assj_strmce and Economic
Development," A1.11erican Ecor:.ot'li.c Review, LVI (SGptember 1966),
page 712, column b. For Canada, Icelacd, aJd Spain they were com
puted from import-income relationships in the 1950's.

5
Although it is pushing th 1:?se data farth2r than they can
bear, not !east because of the differcnti~l changes in rates
where multiple e2rchange rates were involved, it is possible to
compute the price elasticities ~mplied by the difference between computed 2nd actual e,~po-::-ts and imports by 1_~sing the effective devaluatiora sho..,m in Td,ile 1 (wi::hout m:1king ;;i.llow2..nce,
however, for the effects on demarrd of domestic price increases).
Where devaluation "worked" (assuring th2 right signs) these
elasticities ra::.1ge fro::1 .02 to L54 on ~:he export side, and from
.08 to • 94 on the ir:port side. Significantly, tlv~y are all
quite low, as would be expected in the pe:;::iod fri,r,f"dtately
followircg deve.!.'J.ation.
6

For

11

country th: .t r:-:i.nnct infl.aeuce tl:s foreign currency
0

prices of its :tmpm~ts, the d.:YvD.luatton•··l.nduced deterioration in
terms of trade wi1.J. bs kh / (h
X

X

+ e ),
X

devaluation 3pplicable to e:tports, h

X

i;.;h2re k is the proportional

is the price elasticity of

domestic ot:pply of exports, an.de., is the price elasticity of
.;-::..

foreign dema.nd for exports,
chan.ged if h

X

is zero or e

X

Th0 terms of trade will re~ain un-

is in£inite; a.t the other extreme,
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Footnote 6 continued:
the terms of trade will worsen by the full amount of the de
valuation, k, if e

X

is zero or h

X

is infinite. This formulation

neglects the impact on the terms of trade of devaluation-ind uced
changes in the level of total demand, an impact which is likely
to be negligible for the cases considered here.

7

A more formal analysis of the conditions under which de-

valuation will be deflationary is given in Appendix B.
8

In at least one case, South Vietnam in 1966, currency de-

valuation was undertaken specifically because of its expected
deflationary impact, not to improve the balance of payments.
9A
comparison of column 1 of Table 7 with column 2 of
Table 2 indicates that in five of these 14 cases--Colombia
(1962), Greece, Iceland (1960), and Korea (1961 and 1964)-
the balance improved when measured in foreign currency, illus
trating the intermediate case, discussed in Appendix B, where

devaluation may improve the payments position yet still be de
flationary.
10

See Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Exchange Rate Devaluation

in a Semi-Industrial ized Country, Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press,
1965; and Andreas S. Gerakis, "Recession in the Initial Phase
of a Stabilization Program: The Experience of Finland," IMF
Staff Papers, XI (November 1964), pp. 434-45.

-62-

11

Roberto Alemann, "Economic Development of Argentina," in

Committee for Economic Development, Economic Development Issues,
Latin America, New York, 1967, page 51.
12 The

discussion usually focusses on increases in the

local prices of imports. But the local prices of exports will
also ordinarily increase, and where exports are staple con
sumption items, as with beef in Argentina or rice in Southeast
Asia, this factor may have a greater effect on the cost of
living than the rise in import prices.
13

A more formal analysis of this proposition is given in

Appendix

c.

14 Technically, spending could fall even with the maintenance
of real incomes if national hoarding were to rise, an unlikely
event except as a result of certain devaluation-induced re
distributions of income, discussed in Section IV.
Total real income need not fall either if there are un
employed resources and output is responsive to devaluation.
Even in this case, however, the real incomes of some employed
factors may be expected to fall.
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15
· In partial equilibrium term3, these two points can be
illustrated in the following diagram, showing the demand schedule
for an imported product in the devaluing country. The initial
exchange rate would lead to a domestic price P

I

if the imports

0

were unrestraine d, but quotas limit imports to q , permitting
0

the importers to charge a domestic price P.

P'

less than 1 -

p0

o

A devaluation by

will raise the cost of foreign exchange to

0

importers, e.g. to P but with local competition it will result
1
in no change in prices charged in local markets.
the quantity of imports at q.

Quotas hold

A devaluation by more than this

0

amount will raise local prices above P, but not by an amount
0
proportiona l to the devaluation , and will reduce imports.

If

along with devaluation import quotas are also removed, and if
P'
the devaluation is less than 1 - _.£
, local prices will fall
p
0

to a point like P , and imports will increase to q • If the im1
1
port is an intermediat e product, this will lower the prices of
competitive ly priced finished goods.

Local ,
price

p
0

J_ __

p'
0

I
.

-l-

I

I
I

I
I

+- ~\
I

\

I

I
Quantity
imported
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16

This last development is said to have been important in

Colombia in both 1962 and 1965.

See John Sheahan and Sara

Clark, "The Response of Colombian Exports to Variations in Ef
fective Exchange Rates," Research Memorandum No. 11, Williams
College, June 1967, mimeo.
17This percentage is related to that in Table 1 by the
formula k/(1-k), where k is the effective devaluation for im
ports. The difference arises because the figures in Table 1
reckon each exchange rate in terms of dollars per unit of local
currency, whereas its reciprocal is relevant for indicating
the increase in local currency prices of imports, dollar prices
remaining unchanged.
18

Regressions of prices on changes in the money supply

alone resulted in a coefficient close to unity, but with very
little of the cross-sectional variation explained.
It should be noted that the standard errors on the estimated

.

.

coefficients for cl in both equations and for Fin the wholesale
price equation are rather high, indicating low reliability in
the relationship with these two variables. The constant terms are
of no consequence.
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19 In Colombia the
presidency alternates between the two
leading parties every four years under a 1957 agreement; in
Costa Rica quadrennial elections have always led to a change in
government since the Second World Har.
20

In Peru, the president is chief executive for a term of

six years.

However, he also appoints a prime minister to pre

side over the cabinet, which is responsible to the Congress, and
President Prado appointed Pedro Beltran as prime minister and
minister of finance in July 1961, charging him with straightening
out the economic situation.

Appendix A
1

This notion of effective devaluation differs from another

one sometimes used, viz., the nominal devaluation corrected
for increases in domestic prices. While correction for increases
in domestic prices is important in assessing the incentive
effects created by devaluation, especially in countries with
rapid price increases, such price increases are treated separate
ly here.
2
Evangelos Ap. Eliades, "Stabilization of the Greek Economy
and the 1953 Devaluation of the Drach:na," IMF Staff Papers, IV,
(September 1954), pp. 51-52; and Schlorne Riemer, "The Devaluation
of the Israel Pound," Kyklos, XV (1962), Fasc. 3, pp. 657-670.
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Appendix B
1see my "Devaluation
and Aggregate Dema.nd," Yale Economic
Growth Center Discussion Pr;;,er No. 55, June 1968, mimeo,

